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Abstract: Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for 
something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing 
one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a 
scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. 
Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical the-
ory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and com-
plete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly 
renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeter-
minate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts 
to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism 
with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain false-
hoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the 
nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threat-
ens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical 
status of the mind.  
2  Guy Dove – Andreas Elpidorou 
Organon F 2020: 1–29 
Keywords: Consciousness; materialism; mental; metaphysics; mind; 
physical; physicalism; reduction; theory. 
1. Introduction 
 Physicalism faces what is known as “Hempel’s Dilemma.”1 This dilemma 
emerges in an attempt to answer the question of how we are to characterize 
the physical. Not to put too fine a point on it, we can either choose to 
characterize it in terms of some current theory or some future theory. Those 
who support the second option typically appeal to a complete and ideal 
future theory. Neither option seems particularly promising: Choosing cur-
rent physical theory would almost assuredly make physicalism false or in-
coherent,2 and choosing a future theory would seem to render physicalism 
indeterminate or perhaps trivial.3  
 The purpose of this essay is to argue that a similar dilemma threatens 
any (non-eliminativist) approach to the mental that attempts to answer 
significant metaphysical questions about the status of the mind. The idea 
itself is fairly straightforward: Currentism with respect to the mental is 
likely to lead to false claims and futurism leaves too many questions unan-
swered. Insofar as a metaphysical position takes the content of “mental” as 
either settled or unproblematic, it will falter against the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of this dilemma. The dilemma thus threatens the foundations of the 
current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind. 
 
1  Hempel (1969; 1980), but see also Chomsky (2000), Crane and Mellor (1990), 
and Melnyk (1997). 
2  If “physical” means the posits of current physics, then physicalism—the view 
that holds that everything that exists is physical—is false because the inventory of 
current physics is incomplete. In addition, if understood in terms of current physics, 
physicalism is likely incoherent because of the existing inconsistencies between the 
subfields of physics (Wilson 2006) 
3  We do not know what such a future theory would look like, nor do we know 
whether it will end up positing mental entities as fundamental. The fact that it is 
not possible to determine which of these options—indeterminancy or triviality—will 
obtain just further highlights the epistemic challenges facing those who embrace the 
second horn of the dilemma. 
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 We want to be absolutely clear about what is, and is not, on offer. The 
dilemma provides neither a positive argument for physicalism nor a refuta-
tion of anti-physicalism. The challenge posed by the existence of phenome-
nal consciousness to physicalist attempts to understand our place in the 
world does not magically disappear by acknowledging the difficulties that 
characterizations of the mental face. What the dilemma does is to expose 
an important blind spot shared by many standard positions in the philo-
sophical discussion of the metaphysical status of the mental. Many partici-
pants in this discussion acknowledge the need for precision and nuance when 
it comes to articulating the ways in which the mental could be related to 
the physical. It is precisely due to such a concerted and sustained effort to 
better understand the relationship between the mental and the physical 
that the literature has been populated by attempts to describe and refine 
the notions of identity, reduction, supervenience, realization, emergence, 
and grounding and apply them to the mind-body problem.4 Furthermore, 
both proponents and critics of physicalism have rightly paid much attention 
to the nature of the physical, asking what it is and how it can be defined.5 
Unfortunately, however, the very same participants often fail to apply the 
same kind of rigor and questioning attitude when it comes to the nature of 
the mental as it figures in the mind-body (or brain) problem. Instead, they 
typically appeal to intuitive, rough-and-ready characterizations of the men-
tal (qua mental phenomenon) that are thought to suffice for the purposes 
of examining the metaphysical status of mentality.  
 There are prima facie reasons to question the adequacy of such charac-
terizations. Consider the case of vitalism. Historically, the phenomenon of 
life was thought to provide a clear exception to materialism. One factor 
contributing to vitalism’s demise was the inability of its supporters to settle 
on a precise characterization of vital forces (Mayr 1982). The comparison 
between consciousness and life has on occasion been dismissed as little more 
 
4  The literature is too expansive to review here. For recent surveys, see Elpidorou 
(2017), Stoljar (2015), and Tiehen (2018). 
5  See, e.g., Bokulich (2011); Dove (2016); Dowell (2006); Melnyk (1997) and 
(2003); Montero (2001) and (2009); Montero and Papineau (2005); Ney (2008); 
Spurrett and Papineau (1999); Stoljar (2001); Tiehen (2016); Vicente (2011); Wilson 
(2006); Witmer (2016); and Worley (2006). 
4  Guy Dove – Andreas Elpidorou 
Organon F 2020: 1–29 
than a weak argument from analogy (e.g., Chalmers 2003). However, the 
overall success of physicalist explanations of phenomena that were previ-
ously thought to be exceptions to physicalism (Melnyk 2003) and the ap-
parent causal closure of the physical (Papineau 2001) suggest that a more 
robust account of the mental might be required, just as a richer account of 
life was required. To put the same point somewhat differently, we need to 
have reasons that are not shaped by retrospective bias to think that our 
ideas about the nature of the mental are more solid than our past ideas 
about life. In the absence of such reasons, the rich, robust, and diverse 
circumstantial case for physicalism weighs heavily and forces us to take 
seriously the idea that there might be more to the mental than what our 
intuitive characterizations of it reveal. 
 Our aim in this paper is to demonstrate why an appeal to an intuitive, 
pre-theoretical notion of the mental is insufficient for the purposes of inves-
tigating the ontological status of the mental and specifically, of conscious-
ness. Although a comparison between vitalism and physicalism (or between 
the concept of life and the concept of mental) is suggestive, our case does 
not rest on that comparison. In fact, we will show that there are reasons 
internal to the debate pertaining to the ontological status of consciousness 
that support the need for a rich account of the mental. Because of that, 
characterizations of the mental—just like those of the physical—face a 
choice between currentism or futurism. 
 There has been remarkable progress in both scientific and philosophical 
investigations of the nature of mentality. Precisely because of such progress, 
the nature of mentality cannot be assumed to be an unproblematic given. 
Indeed, we have not reached a settled understanding of the mental yet, nor 
do we know enough to predict confidently how future theories will describe 
the mental. But if the meaning of “mental” as this figures in the mind-body 
problem is unclear, not fully understood, or subject to revision and change, 
as we will argue that it is, then claims about the relationship between the 
mental to the physical would also be unclear, not fully understood, or sub-
ject to revision and change. According to our view, progress in resolving the 
mind-body problem is unlikely to take place without first acknowledging 
that we have only a limited grasp of the nature of mentality.  
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2. Why is this a New Dilemma? 
 Given that our dilemma mirrors Hempel’s Dilemma to some degree, one 
might wonder why there has been almost no discussion of it to date.6 One 
reason may be the perception that anti-physicalism and non-physicalist 
views just do not face the same sort of questions as physicalism. Giving 
voice to this perception, Levine and Trogdon (2009, 356) write: 
A longstanding issue in the philosophy of mind is how to specify 
the sense of “physical” at issue with materialism. There is no 
corresponding problem, however, for specifying mentality; mental 
properties are either conscious properties or intentional proper-
ties.  
We do not take Levine and Trogdon’s remark as proof that there is an 
agreed-upon characterization of the mental. What the quoted passage sug-
gests instead is that, compared to the task of articulating the physical, 
describing the mental is an easier task. In the case of the mental, we have 
some grasp of the essence of mentality: whatever the mental is, it is either 
the phenomenal or the intentional, or both. Such an understanding of the 
mental can then serve as our starting point in sketching out the various 
positions in the debate surrounding the ontological status of the mind and 
its relationship to the brain, body, and world.   
 As a matter of actual philosophical practice, there appears to be little 
disagreement concerning how to broadly define the mental. Although we do 
not quarrel with the cultural or sociological significance of this claim, we do 
challenge the notion that such general agreement regarding the mental set-
tles anything. Consider, for example, what would happen if all the philoso-
phers who support physicalism got together and agreed once and for all 
that the physical should be defined in terms of a commitment to Cartesian 
corpuscles. Ex hypothesis there would be no disagreement concerning how 
to characterize the physical. But this would not in any way remove the 
 
6  The only explicit discussion of this new dilemma that we have found is in (Gillett 
and Witmer 2001). Tellingly, they dismiss it straight away. They contend that our 
special epistemic access to mental entities blocks the dilemma. See section 3 below 
for a discussion of this approach. 
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challenge posed by Hempel’s Dilemma, which has nothing to do with phil-
osophical agreement and everything to do with accuracy and truth.  
 Reflecting a kind of philosophical common sense (at least within analytic 
philosophy), Levine and Trogdon offer a disjunctive characterization of the 
mental, defining it in terms of either conscious or intentional properties. 
Because conscious properties are central to so many of the important de-
bates concerning the mental and the physical, we are going to focus on them 
exclusively in this essay. However, the same arguments that we employ with 
respect to characterizing the mental in terms of conscious properties can be 
employed mutatis mutandis to attempts to define it in terms of intention-
ality.7 When we turn to questions concerning the nature of conscious prop-
erties, we find that there is a great deal of disagreement concerning how to 
define them. In other words, all that is accomplished by the disjunctive 
characterization offered above is that it pushes the problem down a level. 
Or so we will argue in section 3. 
 An additional reason for the lack of consideration of our proposed di-
lemma is that claims about the mental play a different role in the debate 
over physicalism than our claims about the physical. At a minimum, phys-
icalism rests on the universally quantified claim that all relevant phenom-
ena, including those that we identify as mental, are ultimately physical. 
Under the typical rough-and-ready formulation, physicalism holds that 
there is nothing over and above the physical. Hempel’s concerns our pur-
ported inability to arrive at a characterization of the physical that is able 
to support this universal claim. In particular, supporters of the dilemma 
focus on our inability to rule out fundamental mental properties, entities, 
events, etc. that would seem to violate physicalism. Given this, a strictly 
analogous dilemma would apply to idealism or what might be called men-
talism (the claim that there is nothing over and above the mental). Of 
course, contemporary adherents of this sort of metaphysical position are 
hard to find. Instead, anti-physicalists tend to defend the existentially quan-
tified claim that particular mental properties, entities, events, etc. are ulti-
mately not physical ones. Thus, if our dilemma is to be relevant to contem-
 
7  Indeed, we suggest that it will likely be easier to make the case with respect to 
intentional properties because their theoretical nature is more apparent. 
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porary debates, it needs to undermine our confidence in our ability to char-
acterize mental phenomena in such a way that confirms or disconfirms this 
more circumscribed metaphysical thesis. In keeping with this, we endeavor 
to show that our dilemma does indeed undermine confidence in such claims. 
We argue that neither our current understanding of the mental nor our 
projectible future understanding is up to the job of settling such metaphys-
ical questions. 
 The lack of discussion of our proposed dilemma could also be due to the 
fact that it is a late entry into a crowded field. We already know that the 
mental presents special philosophical challenges. After all, there is an ex-
tensive literature on a number of well-established problems concerning the 
mental–including the relationship, causal or otherwise, between the mind 
and body (Jackson 1982; Chalmers 1996; Kim 1998; Libet 1985; Robb and 
Heil 2013), the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996), the 
knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), and the explanatory gap (Levine 
1983; Nagel 1974). Do we really need a new problem concerning the mental? 
We think that we do. One of the reasons that we think this is that the 
problem identified in this essay is very different than the other better-known 
problems. Indeed, it creates conceptual challenges for most of the currently 
identified problems because they generally view the mental as a serious 
threat to physicalism or, more broadly, naturalism. Following Jackson 
(1998), we can categorize most of the traditional puzzles as “location prob-
lems” where the core issues are concerned with how to place mental entities 
or properties in a physical or natural world. These problems generally de-
pend on accepting certain positive claims about the nature of the mental. 
The new dilemma—which we will heretofore refer to as “DaM” for Dilemma 
about the Mental—seems to make both the formulation and solution of 
location problems harder. 
 Lastly, one might think that DaM does not apply to the mental because 
of the general perception that the sources of Hempel’s original dilemma are 
the very features of physicalism that supporters of alternative metaphysical 
accounts of the mental oppose, such as commitments to metaphysical nat-
uralism, reductionism about the mental,8 and perhaps some variety of 
 
8  Here we are treating reductionism as the position that holds that the mental is 
nothing over and above the physical. 
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scientism.9 Because many metaphysical stances on the mental involve an 
explicit disavowal of these features,10 it is not surprising that their support-
ers would not worry about an analogous dilemma.11 We suggest that this 
perception is mistaken. Hempel’s Dilemma primarily arises from two related 
elements. The first is a set of reasons to think that our current understanding 
of the physical is incomplete or inadequate. Certainly the fact that, taken as 
a whole, contemporary physics is inconsistent counts as a red flag (Wilson 
2006). The second is a set of reasons to think that our future understanding 
will be theoretically transformative in ways that are difficult to appreciate 
from our current epistemic standpoint. A history consisting of profound 
theoretical upheavals with respect to our conception of the physical provides 
an inductive case for the likelihood of radical future theoretical innovation.  
 We propose that analogs of these two elements—neither of which requires 
a commitment to naturalism, reductionism, or scientism—are present with 
respect to the mental. We take our current understanding of the mental to 
be, at the very least, significantly incomplete or inadequate. And we believe 
that a future understanding of the mental is likely to be theoretically trans-
formative. Consider, for example, what the possibilities of conscious AI, tele-
portation, or brain-to-brain communication could teach us about the mind. 
3. Troubles with Currentism  
 In this section, we set out to accomplish two things. First, we argue 
that there is actually substantial disagreement concerning the nature of 
 
9  The term scienticism is often used with a negative connotation. However, there 
has been a recent effort to reclaim the positive sense of this term (e.g., Ladyman and 
Ross 2007) in much the same way that some philosophers of mind have sought to 
reclaim the positive sense of reductionism (e.g., Churchland and Churchland 1992). 
10  It is important to recognize that this characterization is not universal. For 
example, Chalmers (1996, 128) defends a form of dualism that “…is naturalistic 
because it posits that everything is a consequence of a network of basic properties 
and laws.” 
11  Physicalists, on the contrary, are not particularly focused on finding new 
problems concerning the mental. 
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conscious properties. Second, we contend that this disagreement throws 
currentism into question.  
3.1. Historical precursors 
 Before we get to our argument, we want to acknowledge that our focus 
on the question of how to characterize conscious properties is not without 
precedent. We are not the first to highlight the philosophical importance of 
this issue. Consider a well-known anecdote concerning a public interaction 
between the philosophers Herbert Feigl and Rudolph Carnap (we are relying 
on Tim Crane’s 2007 recounting of this event). In the course of a talk defend-
ing physicalism at UCLA, Feigl admitted that science had yet to provide a 
physical explanation of the qualia associated with phenomenal experience. 
Carnap, who was is in the audience, purportedly interrupted Feigl, and the 
following exchange is supposed to have happened (Crane 2007, 16-17): 
 Carnap:  But Feigl, there is something missing from your lecture. Science 
is beginning to explain qualia in terms of the alpha factor! 
 Feigl:   Carnap, please tell me: What is the alpha factor? 
 Carnap:  Well, Feigl if you tell me what qualia are, I’ll tell you what 
the alpha factor is. 
Whether or not this conversation actually occurred in this manner, we agree 
with Crane that the point about qualia is well taken.12 Too many philo-
sophical discussions about consciousness in general and phenomenal  
conscious properties in particular rest on the implicit assumption that these 
phenomena are well understood. 
 Carnap’s rejoinder fits with the general positivist emphasis on the need 
for philosophers to clearly define their terms, preferably in a way that 
meshes with the physical sciences. We raise the question of how to charac-
terize conscious properties for different reasons than Carnap: we are not 
positivists, we are not defending physicalism, and we are not dismissing the 
 
12  In another article, Crane (2001, 170) laments: “To have a clear understanding of 
this problem, we have to have a clear understanding of the notion of qualia. But 
despite the centrality, it seems to me that there is not a clear consensus about how 
the term ‘qualia’ should be understood, and to this extent the contemporary problem 
of consciousness is not well-posed.” 
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relevance of conscious properties. We don’t even fully agree with Carnap 
about the facts on the ground. In contrast to his assessment, we think that 
philosophers have in fact tried to tell us what conscious properties are. 
Indeed, a lot of work has been done on this topic in the intervening decades. 
The trouble is that these philosophers often provide very different answers, 
and their disagreement threatens the first horn of the dilemma. 
3.2. The Center will not Hold 
 To date, we have found only one explicit discussion of something like 
DaM: Gillett and Witmer (2001) acknowledge the prima facie plausibility 
of such a dilemma but then argue that it is blocked by our special epistemic 
access to mental entities. However, special epistemic access is not enough 
to block DaM because even if we grant that such access exists this would 
not guarantee that one possesses an adequate understanding of the mental. 
This seems particularly true of consciousness itself, which of course lies at 
the center of the disagreement over the status of mental entities. Chalmers 
(1996, 3) himself notes that consciousness, “can be frustratingly diaphanous: 
in talking about conscious experience, it is notoriously difficult to pin down 
the subject matter.” Indeed, the claim that we have some kind of special or 
privileged access to our mental states often reduces to one or both of the 
following claims: (i) Mental states are self-luminous (if a subject is in mental 
state M, then the subject knows that they are in M) and (ii) Mental states 
are incorrigible (if a subject believes that they are in mental state M, then 
they are in M). Neither claim suffices to show that we know the nature of 
our mental states.  
 Even if one restricts the mental to (phenomenally) conscious properties, 
our understanding depends upon our conceptualization of such properties. 
What this shows is that what we take to be features of conscious properties 
depends on the nature of our phenomenal concepts (i.e., the concepts that 
we use when we introspectively examine the phenomenal character of our 
experience). If the deployment of phenomenal concepts in introspection re-
veals to us the entire13 nature of their referents, then currentism is safe. But 
 
13  If phenomenal concepts reveal only part of the essence of their referents, then 
we could still be mistaken about the nature of consciousness and qualia.  
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why should one accept such a strong claim? The use of phenomenal concepts 
may reveal only part of the essence of their referents, or it may only reveal 
accidental features of their referents (ones that allow us to uniquely identify 
them in the actual world), or it may fail to reveal any features at all.14 If 
any of these three possibilities could be true, then it would undermine cur-
rentism.  
 Moreover, there are very good reasons to be concerned about our current 
understanding of conscious properties. Their precise nature has been—to 
echo the quote from Chalmers given above—notoriously difficult to pin 
down. Responding to the question of what qualia are, Block (1980, 278) 
famously quipped “As Louis Armstrong said when asked what Jazz is, ‘If 
you got to ask, you ain’t never gonna get to know’.” The trouble is that a 
number of people have asked and, more importantly, given different an-
swers.15 Some categorically deny the existence of qualia at all (Dennett 
1991). Others deny that qualia exist where one might think that they 
should. For instance, Tye and Harman, utilizing the supposition that expe-
riences are transparent or diaphanous, have claimed that qualia are not 
properties of our visual experiences (e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000; cf. 
Dretske 1995).16 Some make the controversial claim that qualia are (or re-
duce to) the representational contents of our experiences (e.g., Dretske 1995; 
Lycan 1996). Others hold instead that qualia are intrinsic, non-representa-
tional properties of our experiences (e.g, Block 1990; Peacocke 1983). Yet 
others hold a relational (i.e., direct realist) account of qualia (e.g., Campbell 
 
14  See Nida-Rümelin (2006) and Goff (2011) and critical discussions in Diaz-Leon 
(2014), Elpidorou (2016) and Trogdon (2016). 
15  Our discussion of qualia in this section follows that of Crane (2001). We 
recommend looking to his paper for a richer and more detailed discussion of the 
diversity of opinion that exists within the philosophical literature concerning this 
fundamental notion. 
16  Tye (2017) explains: “[Q]ualia, conceived of as the immediately ‘felt’ qualities of 
experiences of which we are cognizant when we attend to them introspectively, do 
not really exist. The qualities of which we are aware are not qualities of experiences 
at all, but rather qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities of 
things in the world (as in the case of perceptual experiences) or of regions of our 
bodies (as in the case of bodily sensations). This is not to say that experiences do 
not have qualia. The point is that qualia are not qualities of experiences.” 
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2002; Brewer 2011). Finally, there is even disagreement as to what organ-
isms undergo states with qualia. Do insects, for instance, experience qualia?  
 The aforementioned disagreements are substantial. If we do not know 
where on the phylogenetic scale qualia start to appear, then we do not have 
a good understanding of the necessary biological conditions for their exist-
ence. If we do not know whether qualia should be individuated narrowly or 
widely, then we do know what kind of contribution (causal or constitu-
tional) the world makes. And, most importantly, if we cannot agree whether 
qualia are properties of experiences or not, then it is unclear whether we 
have really understood the notion of qualia. 
 But isn’t there something intuitively clear and distinctive about our con-
scious experiences (e.g., Chalmers 2010)? Don’t we know that in some sense 
or another qualia must exist? Don’t we know what the redness of the setting 
sun is? If so, isn’t that, admittedly minimal, and pre-theoretical understand-
ing of qualia sufficient to furnish us with a satisfactory account of mentality? 
The answer, we believe, is simply “No.” As noted by both Crane (2001) and 
Keely (2009), many of the same claims that are made in support of qualia 
were made about the currently disfavored notion of sense-data. For example, 
Price in an article from 1932 (quoted by Crane 2001, 175) explains: 
The term sense-datum is meant to be a neutral term … The term 
is meant to stand for something whose existence is indubitable 
(however fleeting) something from which all theories of percep-
tion ought to start. 
Now the mere fact that many of the same, controversial claims made about 
qualia were made about the earlier notion of sense-data does not in and of 
itself show that the former are false, but it does suggest that more is needed 
to settle the matter than a careful self-examination of our inner experience.  
 Furthermore, the minimal understanding of qualia that one is able to 
find when one introspects on one’s experiences is insufficient to answer the 
many questions that would allow us to expose the nature of qualia. Can 
one, simply by focusing on the painfulness of pain or the redness of a Rothko 
painting, settle whether qualia are properties of experiences or not? Can 
they determine whether the environment or our bodies make a constitutive 
contribution to the content of our experience? Can they tell whether it is a 
possible for a physical and functional duplicate of an acrophobic subject to 
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fail to experience fear when they stand near the edge of a tall building? Can 
they resolve the issue of whether qualia are physical or not? By itself, a 
minimal, pre-theoretical understanding of qualia, if such a thing exists, can-
not settle the nature of mentality. This is evident not only by the vast array 
of diverging and in some cases contradicting accounts of qualia, all of which 
seem to appeal to this pre-theoretical notion of qualia (see, e.g., Tye (2017) 
for an overview), but also by the fact that attempts to specify further the 
nature of qualia require substantial assumptions about the nature of intro-
spection, awareness, representation, and concepts. 
 One could argue that our focus on qualia is somewhat dated. In other 
words, one could possibly claim that our discussion of currentism is not 
current enough. Current discussions of conscious properties—so the argu-
ment might go—are not as reliant on either the term or the concept of 
qualia. We are willing to grant the possibility that such a shift might be 
underway. One might even be able to find quantitative evidence for the 
waning influence of the concept of qualia (tied perhaps to the decreased use 
of this term). This, however, would not be enough to undermine our general 
point. What needs to be shown to do this is that significant theoretical 
disagreement about the precise nature of conscious properties does not exist. 
We hold the line here and maintain that, if anything, the level of disagree-
ment has increased. In fact, it seems likely that the very reason for the 
emerging distaste for the term qualia (a distaste which is by no means uni-
versal) is a lack of agreement about the nature of qualia. Moreover, it is 
hard not to see how this purported shift away from qualia is not grist for 
our mill. After all, if the notion of qualia is currently falling out of favor the 
way that sense-data fell out of favor decades ago, then we have some in-
ductive reason to question our current understanding. Again, this is not an 
argument that we will never arrive at a successful theory. More importantly, 
it is not an attack on the effort to theorize about the nature of conscious 
properties. Instead, it is merely pointing out there is reason to think that 
our current understanding is not accurate or secure enough to settle im-
portant metaphysical questions.  
 We propose that the existence of significant disagreement about the very 
nature of conscious properties impugns our current state of knowledge. This 
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is not a denial of the existence of conscious properties but rather an assess-
ment of our current understanding of them. Despite appearances to the con-
trary, our current understanding of mentality (at least as it is defined relative 
to conscious properties) is far from complete and likely to be mistaken in 
significant ways. Future developments in philosophy, biology, neuroscience, 
and psychology could render many of our beliefs about mentality false.17 
4. The Prospects of Futurism 
 Above we argued that our current understanding of mentality leaves 
much to be desired. Could one characterize the mental in terms of a final 
and complete theory or account of the mental? Just as any meaningful form 
of physicalism must avoid positing sui generis non-physical entities, any 
meaningful and positive account of the character and ontology of the mental 
must avoid a robust eliminativism in which the mental does not exist. We 
believe that a futurist approach is fraught with difficulties. Our main con-
tention is that, given our current epistemic standing in regard to mentality, 
the shape of this final theory or account is severely and problematically (for 
present purposes) indeterminate. This is due primarily to two facts. First, 
there are a number of competing theories of the mental that might turn out 
to be true. Second, most (if not all) of these possible final theories are rad-
ically transformative insofar as their success would require a substantial 
revision of our current understanding of the mental. The question remains: 
Does this revision amount to a wholesale rejection of the mental as it is 
currently understood or not? We suggest that we do not know enough about 
the future outcomes of our theories of mentality to be in a position to make 
an informed judgment about their content. 
 Consider for instance the following possible final theories about the men-
tal: emergentism, non-reductive physicalism (e.g., realization), neutral mon-
ism, property dualism, panpsychism, or something completely new and  
 
17  Scientific discoveries, e.g., blindsight (Weiskrantz 1980) and the two visual 
streams hypothesis (Milner and Goodale 2006), and conceptual advances, e.g., the 
phenomenal/access consciousness distinction (Block 1995) have transformed our 
understanding of consciousness and thus of mentality. 
A Dilemma about the Mental 15 
Organon F 2020: 1–29 
unknown. Obviously the last option is a non-starter as a means of avoiding 
indeterminacy. But all the other ones are also problematic. Indeed, many 
of the problems that beset a currentist attempt to define the mental also 
beset these future theories. As we saw in the previous section, our current 
understanding of conscious properties is at best incomplete. On the one 
hand, there is significant disagreement about the nature of conscious prop-
erties, and on the other hand, any understanding of conscious properties 
that can serve as the “common denominator” across different positions ap-
pears to be incapable of settling substantial questions about the character 
of the mental. Consequently, any attempt to characterize the mental on the 
basis of a future theory that utilizes our current understanding of qualia 
would be problematic insofar as the content of such a future theory is (given 
our current epistemic perspective) severely indeterminate. We just do not 
know which of the many competing accounts of the mental we ought to 
accept, and if we opt for a minimal (or “thin”) understanding of the mental, 
then our future theory will fail to specify the ontological status of the men-
tal. The point is simple: we don’t know enough about qualia right now to 
be able to draw meaningful conclusions concerning how the notion of qualia 
will be developed in the future.  
 Finally, it will not work to characterize the mental in terms of a final 
theory but not specify whether that theory is, e.g., panpsychism, neutral 
monism, or realization physicalism. Each of them tells us something rad-
ically different about the nature of mentality. Put crudely, the first holds 
that the mental is fundamental, the second holds that fundamentally 
nothing is mental, and the third holds that the mental exists but only 
derivatively (it is nothing over and above the physical). The fact that some 
of our candidates for a final theory of the mental are deeply at odds with 
each other shows that before we can define the mental by using one of these 
theories, we have to decide which one is likely to be true. But if philosophical 
debates about the nature of consciousness are any indication, we are far 
away from being able to do so. All in all, the prospects of futurism appear 
to be rather dim. 
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5. Objections and Replies 
 We have argued that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a 
dilemma similar to the one faced by physicalists in their efforts to define 
the physical. Given our contemporary understanding of the mind—includ-
ing all that we have gathered through our phenomenological experiences, 
philosophical investigations, and the psychological and brain sciences—nei-
ther currentism nor futurism with respect to consciousness and other pur-
portedly non-physical mental properties holds much promise. Recognizing 
that DaM flies in the face of philosophical conventional wisdom and threat-
ens to upend established philosophical debates concerning the relationship 
of the mental to the physical, we review some possible objections and offer 
responses below. The objections share a common theme: the idea that the 
dilemma, for one reason or another, does not apply to the debate between 
physicalists and anti-physicalists.  
 Before getting to these objections though, we want to emphasize what 
we see as the fundamental force of the dilemma. We suggest that the di-
lemma throws into question our capacity to answer important metaphysical 
questions surrounding consciousness and other mental phenomena given our 
current knowledge. It thus decidedly does not amount to a defense of either 
physicalism or anti-physicalism. What it does do is threaten the arguments 
offered in support of either metaphysical position. In other words, we 
acknowledge that identifying the dilemma does not make consciousness any 
less mysterious or help us to see how it fits in our world. Indeed, the di-
lemma demonstrably adds to the mystery. After all, it demonstrates that 
we know even less we thought we did about conscious properties. DaM in 
no way forces us to deny the presence of the significant epistemic gap that 
inspires most of the important philosophical puzzles. Having said this, we 
need to also point out that DaM becomes an issue for specific formulations 
of these puzzles. If it obtains, then our epistemic grip on the mental may 
well be insufficient to affirm the possibility of inverted spectra or philosoph-
ical zombies, to arrive at an adequate understanding of the super-scientist 
Mary, or to outline clearly the hard problem of consciousness. In other 
words, DaM places pressure on so-called location problems by throwing into 
question our understanding of what is being located.  
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5.1. Objection #1 
 There is an important asymmetry between the roles that the terms 
“physical” and “mental” (or “qualia”) play in our evaluation of physicalist 
theories of mind. “Mental” refers to the properties, entities, events, etc. that 
need to be explained whereas “physical” denotes the set of properties, enti-
ties, events, etc. that are meant to be doing the explaining. Because of the 
role of “physical” we naturally need a precise account of it. However, be-
cause of the non-explanatory role of “mental” we do not need nearly as 
much precision as we need with “physical.” All that we need is some rough 
understanding of mentality—one that perhaps can be given ostensibly: men-
tality is THAT! 
 Reply: We suggest that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of 
the force of the dilemma. To see why, consider the role that Hempel’s orig-
inal dilemma plays in the debate. Few suggest that, because of the dilemma, 
we should eliminate our everyday notion of physical properties, entities, 
events, etc. More to the point, few suggest that we should stop doing physics 
because of the dilemma. What people do suggest is that the dilemma shows 
that we do not know enough about the ultimate nature of the physical to 
answer important metaphysical questions—in particular, the question of 
whether or not mental entities or properties are physical. In an analogous 
fashion, this new dilemma should not be seen as an attack on our everyday 
notion of the mental or indeed on our everyday conception of conscious 
properties.18 Nor should it be seen as attempt to preempt philosophical or 
scientific investigation of these. As was the case with the original dilemma, 
DaM threatens attempts to settle the relevant metaphysical questions by 
an appeal to a substantial account of mentality.  
 Returning to the objection, we can make the issues raised by DaM ex-
plicit. We have no problem granting that there are everyday conceptions of 
phenomenal experience or other mental phenomena that serve as a starting 
point for philosophical investigation. These phenomena may well serve in 
some sense as explananda for philosophical explanation (although we would 
note that in most non-dogmatic areas of human investigation it is not  
 
18  Of course, suggesting that there is an everyday notion of qualia is contentious to 
say the least. This fact alone seems to offer support to our main position.  
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uncommon to modify one’s understanding of what is to be explained in the 
course of developing explanations).19 We do not even question that they 
may raise intriguing metaphysical location problems. We do suggest, 
though, that accounts of such phenomena that are rich enough to address 
the relevant metaphysical questions will need to offer a meaningful charac-
terization of their mentality. As Robert van Gulick notes in his discussion 
of the explanatory gap, “the more we can articulate the structure within 
the phenomenal realm, the greater the chances for physical explanation; 
without structure we have no place to attach our explanatory ‘hooks’” 
(1997, 565). Thus, attempts to determine whether an aspect of our conscious 
life can be explained in physical terms must begin with detailed descriptions 
of that aspect. It is here that the dilemma becomes relevant, for as we 
argued in section 3, our understanding of the mind appears to be both 
incomplete and likely to be mistaken in significant ways. Importantly, this 
problem arises independently of any understanding of the physical. For in-
stance, it would arise within the context of a full-throated idealism where 
everything that exists is mental.  
5.2. Objection #2 
 Because anti-physicalism is defined in terms of its opposition to physi-
calism, it is not undermined by DaM. 
 Reply: We freely admit that DaM arises in the context of positive claims 
about the nature of mentality. This raises the possibility that an anti-phys-
icalism devoid of such claims could elude its reach. We suggest however 
that it is very difficult to envision a substantial form of anti-physicalism 
that is free of positive commitments concerning the character of the mental. 
Given that many arguments for anti-physicalism depend crucially on obser-
vations concerning conscious experience and a number of philosophers of 
science have questioned the very notion of theory-neutral observation  
 
19  In the case of consciousness, P.S. Churchland (1986), P. M. Churchland (1995), 
and Flanagan (1992), among others, have argued for a co-evolutionary approach to 
the problem of consciousness: one that simultaneously examines the problem of 
consciousness both from the physical (biological, neuronal, or bodily) and the mental 
(or phenomenal) perspective.  
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(Azzouni 2004; Bogen 2016; Chang 2005; Duhem 1906; Hanson 1958; Kuhn 
1962), it seems reasonable to suppose that theoretical influences—perhaps 
implicit ones—may be at work.  More importantly, as became apparent in 
our discussion of the current debates surrounding qualia and consciousness, 
there are substantial philosophical disagreements about fundamental as-
pects of mentality. Although these disagreements do not by themselves im-
pugn any particular (anti-physicalist) account, they provide some reason to 
doubt that we are dealing with straightforward ontological issues that can 
be resolved by appealing to a body of evidence about which everyone agrees. 
Furthermore, the debates tend to concern the very nature of the mental. 
More often than not, they involve specific assertions about mental phenom-
ena. Given this, a successful anti-physicalism likely needs to provide some 
positive account of the mental, and this is precisely when the dilemma kicks 
in.  
5.3. Objection #3 
 DaM does not provide support for physicalism. 
 Reply: We agree.20 That was never the point. Indeed, we would go fur-
ther and claim that DaM creates problems for various forms of physicalism. 
For instance, many won’t work as a means of avoiding DaM because we 
still need to know what the mental entities are that supervene on, are real-
ized by, or are grounded in the physical. Full-throated forms of elimini-
tivism (Churchland, 1981; Bickle, 2003) may avoid this problem, but such 
views have their own challenges.  
 In addition, DaM undermines the popular strategy of defending physi-
calism by positing a No Fundamental Mentality constraint (Wilson 2006) 
or equating the physical with the non-mental (Spurrett and Papineau 1999; 
Montero 2009; Montero and Papineau 2005). Let’s consider the constraint 
approach first. If we choose our current understanding of the mental, then 
any No Fundamental Mentality constraint will be trivially true simply be-
cause our current understanding of the mental is likely to be false. If we 
 
20  After all, physicalism still faces Hempel’s original dilemma. For discussion and 
proposed solutions see Dove (2016); Elpidorou and Dove (2018); Hempel (1980); Ney 
(2008); Prelevic (2017); and van Fraassen (2002). 
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choose some future complete and ideal theory, then the proposed constraint 
is going to be empty. Similar problems face the stratagem of equating the 
physical with the non-mental. More generally, DaM further muddies the 
water with respect to the question of whether or not a complete physics 
contains fundamental mental entities.  
5.4. Objection #4  
 Just as Hempel’s Dilemma turns on an appeal to theories of the physical, 
DaM requires an appeal to theories of the mental. This is a problem for 
DaM because we do not have—or need—analogous theories of the mental. 
To the extent that a philosophical position avoids an appeal to theories of 
the mental, it avoids the dilemma. 
 Reply: Not surprisingly, we think that it is harder to avoid theoretical 
claims about the mental than this objection presupposes, but we maintain 
that the objection fails even if we leave this presupposition unchallenged. 
DaM concerns our lack of access to characterizations of the mental that are 
rich enough to settle important metaphysical questions. Avoiding theories 
of the mental does not get us out of this bind. We still have reason to think 
that characterizations based on our current understanding of the mental 
are insufficient and that we know too little about future characterizations 
to draw significant conclusions. Indeed, the situation appears to be worse 
than it is with regard to the physical. For instance, some supporters of 
physicalism have argued that we know enough about current physics to be 
confident that the posits of a complete and ideal future physical theory will 
exclude irreducible mental entities (e.g., Bokulich 2011; for reviews see Dove 
2016; Ney 2008; Stoljar 2015). Yet, in the case of the mental, there is little 
indication that we know enough about what a future account of the mental 
would look like to offer a sufficiently rich characterization of the mental. A 
lack of access to theories of the mental would only exacerbate this problem. 
In the end, the real impetus behind this objection would seem to be a con-
viction that our current understanding of the mental is rich enough to do 
the relevant philosophical work. We have already provided reasons to think 
that it is not. Whether or not one is convinced by our arguments on this 
front, it is clear that simply avoiding theories of the mental does not cir-
cumvent the dilemma.  
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5.5. Objection #5  
 Even if theories of the mental are relevant, most of our current theories 
are not about the mental itself but rather the metaphysical status of the 
mental with respect to the physical.21 In other words, our so-called theories 
of the mental are not theories about mental phenomena the way that phys-
ical theories are about physical phenomena. Because of this, the dilemma 
fails to emerge in the first place. 
 Reply: We have two responses to offer. First, while we acknowledge that 
there are theories of the mental that focus primarily on answering questions 
concerning the relationship of the mental to the physical, it is clear that 
not all of them are content to do only that. For instance, both proponents 
of naturalistic dualism (Chalmers 1996) and panpsychism (see various es-
says in Seager 2020) have sought to offer substantive, positive accounts of 
the mental.  
 Second, even if we were to grant that most theories of the mental are 
primarily interested in investigating the relationship of the mental to the 
physical, we maintain that it is difficult to answer these questions without 
answering fundamental questions about the nature of mental phenomena 
themselves. In order to see why this is the case, we need to consider the 
two horns of our dilemma. 
 Let’s begin with the first horn of the dilemma. In our discussion, we 
highlighted the disagreement that exists with regard to fundamental ques-
tions concerning the nature of qualia. These questions were not limited to 
the relationship of qualia to the physical. Instead, they often concern im-
portant details about qualia themselves, addressing such issues as whether 
they exist at all, how they are introspectively revealed to us, whether they 
are simple or complex, what experiential modalities give rise to them, and 
what sort of creatures experience them. What is important to note isn’t 
merely the existence of this disagreement, but also the fact that the man-
ner in which we might resolve these theoretical disagreements has clear 
 
21  We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possible objection. As 
they succinctly put it, theories of the mental “are not about the mental the way that 
fluid mechanics is about fluids, they are about the relationship between the mental 
and the physical.” 
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implications regarding the metaphysical status of the mental and its rela-
tionship to the physical. After all, much of the recent debate regarding the 
metaphysics of consciousness seems to turn on whether the nature of qualia 
is somehow revealed to us through introspection.22  
 Now consider the second horn of the dilemma. In outlining the problems 
with futurism, we did note that positions such as dualism, neutral monism, 
and panpsychism promise to be transformative. We also suggested that it 
would be hard to offer substantial versions of these positions without mak-
ing significant claims about the nature of mental phenomena in and of 
themselves, but here we don’t need this claim to defeat the objection. If the 
objector is right that contemporary theories of the mental merely address 
its relationship to the physical, then such theories would provide no help at 
all to futurism. They wouldn’t even address the issues raised in the context 
of currentism. 
6. Conclusion 
 In this essay we have argued that our understanding of the mental faces 
a similar (but not completely analogous) dilemma to the one facing our 
understanding of the physical. Our defense of this involved three steps. 
First, we outlined the reasons why this dilemma may have been overlooked 
or quickly dismissed. We argued that these reasons are insufficient and pro-
vided initial motivation for thinking that the dilemma might obtain. Sec-
ond, we demonstrated that both horns of the dilemma are problematic: 
currentism with respect to mental is likely to be at least incomplete or 
inadequate, and futurism remains indeterminate. Third, we defended the 
dilemma against several deflationary objections. If we are right, then phi-
losophers interested in metaphysical questions surrounding the mental need 
to take our dilemma into account. 
 
22  See, e.g., Balog (2012); Chalmers (2007); Diaz-Leon (2014); Elpidorou (2015) 
and (2016); Goff (2011); Hill & McLaughlin (1999); Levin (2007); Levine (2007); 
Loar (1997); Nida-Rümelin (2006); Papineau (2002) and (2007); Schroer (2010), 
Stoljar (2005); Sturgeon (1994); Sundström (2011); Trogdon (2016). 
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It is instructive to compare our position to Stoljar’s (2006) epistemic 
view on consciousness, namely, the view according to which the reason why 
consciousness appears to be other than physical is because we are ignorant 
of some non-experiential but experience-relevant truths. Unlike Stoljar we 
do not use our current ignorance about the nature of qualia or consciousness 
as a way to disarm traditional anti-physicalist objections. Nor do we insist 
that our ignorance is due to an elusive set of non-experiential but experi-
ence-relevant truths. To hold that the only truths about consciousness that 
escape us are non-experiential is to accept that our present understanding 
of (phenomenal) consciousness is more or less complete. DaM denies this 
assumption. Thus, if we are correct to insist that DaM is a problem, then 
our ignorance is larger than it is commonly assumed. The bad news is that 
we do not know as much as we think we do. The good news is that such an 
admission of ignorance opens up the possibility for new and exciting pro-
spects on mentality in general and on consciousness in particular. A more 
complete understanding of the mental could render some of the pesky epis-
temic arguments against physicalism pseudo-problems. Or it could con-
versely show that physicalism is an unattainable position. So, while DaM 
may not resolve traditional philosophical puzzles, it may succeed in trans-
forming them. At the very least, it is a call to action to seek a more philo-
sophically and empirically robust account of the mental. 
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